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ABSTRACT. This archival study investigates the nature and development of Canadian attitudes and policy towards Antarctica
between 1945 and 1962. Throughout this period, the key continuity was the tendency to view Antarctic affairs from an arctic
perspective. Canada, though becoming more preoccupied with the Arctic and avoiding active involvement in Antarctica, found
it difficult to ignore the more remote and distant southern polar region. Although the Arctic and Antarctic are distinct regions in
geographical, political, legal and other terms, they are both polar regions subject to a range of seemingly analogous controversies.
As a result, certain post-1945 developments affecting Antarctica were deemed of potential relevance to its northern counterpart,
thereby encouraging the Canadian government to consider the nature of its political, legal, scientific and other interests in
Antarctica. Canada’s efforts to remain on the sidelines were qualified by the fact that Antarctica was treated as a significant policy
interest by other states—most notably, Australia, Britain and the United States—which not only kept the Canadian government
well informed about developments but also asked frequently for its views. In 1959 the conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty forced
the Canadian government to consider whether or not to accede to the treaty. In the event, the government, guided by a series of
interdepartmental exchanges, decided against accession, which did not take place until 1988.
Key words: Antarctica, Arctic, Antarctic Treaty, United Nations, polar sovereignty, bipolar linkages, sector principle, International
Geophysical Year (IGY)
RÉSUMÉ. Cette étude d’archives examine la nature et le développement des attitudes et des politiques canadiennes envers
l’Antarctique entre 1945 et 1962. Durant toute cette période, l’élément clé de continuité a été la tendance à considérer les questions
de l’Antarctique d’un point de vue arctique. Bien qu’étant de plus en plus préoccupé par l’Arctique et voulant éviter de s’impliquer
activement dans l’Antarctique, le Canada trouvait difficile d’ignorer la région polaire australe plus éloignée et inaccessible.
Quoique l’Arctique et l’Antarctique soient des régions distinctes du point de vue géographique, politique, juridique, ainsi qu’à
d’autres égards, ce sont deux régions polaires sujettes à toute une gamme de controverses apparemment semblables. C’est
pourquoi certains développements affectant l’Antarctique ont été jugés d’une importance potentielle pour son équivalent boréal,
et ont encouragé le gouvernement canadien à examiner la nature de ses intérêts politiques, juridiques, scientifiques et autres dans
l’Antarctique. La résistance du Canada à s’impliquer était conditionnelle au fait que l’Antarctique était vu comme un enjeu
politique important par d’autres nations — en particulier l’Australie, la Grande-Bretagne et les États-Unis — qui, non seulement
gardaient le gouvernement canadien bien informé des développements, mais lui demandaient aussi souvent son opinion. La
signature du Traité sur l’Antarctique en 1959 força le gouvernement canadien à réfléchir à son adhésion éventuelle au traité. En
fait, le gouvernement, guidé par une série d’échanges interministériels, décida alors de ne pas y adhérer et ne le fit qu’en 1988.
Mots clés: Antarctique, Arctique, Traité sur l’Antarctique, Nations unies, souveraineté polaire, liens bipolaires, théorie des
secteurs, Année géophysique internationale (AGI)
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INTRODUCTION
On 24 January 1950 Marcel Duranthon, the French consul
general in Quebec, lectured on Antarctica to the International
Relations Club at Laval University. Reginald Mitchell, the
American consul in Quebec, found it a surprising choice of
topic: “Insofar as this part of Canada is concerned the Antarc-
tic is neither an important nor a timely subject. There would
appear to be little, if any, interest here in this subject and there
is not known to have been any previous public discussion of
the subject here” (Mitchell, 1950). In many respects, Mitchell’s
observation was true for the rest of the country. The some-
what variable and spasmodic nature of government interest in
the North during the interwar and immediate post-1945
periods failed to shake general perceptions of Canada’s status
as an arctic nation (DEA, 1985; Solem and Greenaway,
1989). Unsurprisingly, there existed little or no interest in
what one official described as Canada’s “Far South” (Lloyd,
1947). Canadian newspapers followed Antarctic develop-
ments in a pragmatic, inconsistent manner, as evidenced
during August and September 1948 by stories carried in the
Ottawa Morning Journal (19 August 1948), Montreal Ga-
zette (21 September 1948) and Montreal Star (23 September
1948), while any press reports were notable for their absence
of any reference to Canada’s role and interests in Antarctica.
Only the rare letter from a member of the public, expressing
interest in the subject, was received by the government.
In spite of its wishes, the Canadian government was unable
to insulate itself completely from the affairs of Antarctica,
which attracted greater international interest and activity
during the years following the Second World War. This
period witnessed an increasingly serious controversy over
ownership alongside the multilateral negotiations which cul-
minated eventually in the signature of the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty. Although Antarctica interested only a few countries
and remained a relatively minor issue on the wider interna-
tional stage during the late 1940s and the 1950s, the major
players (Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New
Zealand, Norway, the United States and the Soviet Union)
figured prominently in the broader calculations of Canadian
policymakers, such as in matters touching upon relations with
their powerful southern neighbour, Commonwealth loyal-
ties, the Cold War, hemispheric and Latin American links,
and bipolar interconnections. In addition, Ottawa was kept
fully and regularly apprised of Antarctic developments by
Canadian high commissions and diplomatic missions, most
notably, those located in Buenos Aires, Canberra, London,
Santiago, Washington and Wellington, as well as by Com-
monwealth, United States and other diplomats stationed in
Ottawa. After 1945 Canadian membership of the British
Polar Committee—this was dominated by Antarctic busi-
ness—exerted a similar effect, as did discussions conducted
at gatherings of Commonwealth prime ministers (e.g., Octo-
ber 1948). Canada, albeit technically an outsider, was given
privileged access to confidential documentation and brief-
ings about multilateral exchanges conducted on Antarctica.
Even top secret working papers and memoranda were for-
warded to Ottawa by the United States and Commonwealth
governments.
Therefore, Canada was brought face-to-face with the Ant-
arctic question on several occasions, and forced to consider
the nature of its interests. During 1948, policymakers, discov-
ering that “no policy has been established,” sought to identify
and clarify the nature of Canadian interests in Antarctica
(Blanchette, 1948a). At an early stage of this process, Trevor
Lloyd, chief of the Geographical Bureau at the Department of
Mines, asserted that “Canada’s interests in the Antarctic
regions are only indirect. They do, however, exist” (Lloyd,
1948). Department of External Affairs (DEA) memoranda
drew heavily on Lloyd’s initial listing, and on 30 July 1948
Lester Pearson codified the government’s position (Pearson,
1948). Despite being prepared as a Cabinet paper, Pearson’s
memorandum was never actually brought before the Cabinet,
but was formally approved on 3 August by L.S. St. Laurent,
the Minister of External Affairs.
Naturally, the Arctic remained the prime polar focus for
Canadian policymakers (Pearson, 1945–46; Grant, 1988), as
highlighted in 1948 by the creation of the Advisory Commit-
tee on Northern Development (ACND) to plan and coordi-
nate northern activities (Rowley, 1992). But, after 1945, the
simultaneous, ongoing and emerging nature of the Arctic and
Antarctic questions, including their focus upon a seemingly
similar range of political, legal, scientific and other concerns,
rendered it difficult to avoid drawing analogies between the
two polar regions (Marsden, 1966). Frequent official use of
the word “indirect” to describe national interests in Antarc-
tica failed to obscure the reality that Canada was not totally
disinterested in the course of events therein. This paper
considers the nature and development of Canadian interests
in Antarctica between 1945 and 1962. The close of this period
witnessed the conclusion of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which
became effective in June 1961, thereby transforming the vast
southern continent into a zone of peace, a continent for
science, and a special conservation area (Beck, 1992).
LEGAL INTERESTS
Despite the uncertain and evolving nature of international
law (e.g., requirements for “effective occupation” in sparsely
populated areas, validity of the sector principle), during the
1920s and 1930s successive governments expressed confi-
dence in the strength of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic
(Cory, 1936). Indeed, by the late 1940s the sovereignty
problem was adjudged to be largely settled, particularly as
compared to its southern counterpart, where varying answers
were offered still to the question “Who owns Antarctica?”
(Beck, 1994). Thus, in March 1948 Arthur Blanchette discussed
the escalation of the Argentine-British-Chilean dispute:
Conflicting territorial claims in the Antarctic have become
somewhat of a fixture after decades of concentrated
international exploration there and the recent Argentine-
Chilean expeditions, which served to set off the current
dispute, are but the latest symptoms of a malaise which is
becoming more commonly known as Antarcticitis
(Blanchette, 1948b).
Within Ottawa, these developments were studied closely
for guidance on principles influencing polar sovereignty in
general and in the Arctic in particular, as acknowledged by
Hume Wrong, the Canadian ambassador in Washington
(Wrong, 1946).
By the 1930s, Australia, Britain and New Zealand claimed
over 60% of Antarctica. Membership of the Committee on
Polar Questions enabled Canada to follow discussions con-
ducted at the 1937 Imperial Conference about a possible
challenge to the enclave (Adélie Land) claimed by France
within Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT). The eventual
decision to acquiesce in the French claim was welcomed by
Canada’s representatives, who deprecated “any denial of the
sector principle in Adélie Land” because of possible “embar-
rassing repercussions in the Arctic” (Imperial Conference,
1937). Indeed, Fitzmaurice, the Foreign Office’s legal ad-
viser, minuted that only Australia and Canada displayed
much interest in the subject (Fitzmaurice, 1937).
Wartime events, most notably, the initiation of a permanent
British presence through bases established by “Operation
Tabarin” (Beck, 1987), resulted in a significant upgrading of
official perceptions regarding the criteria required for
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‘effective occupation’ in Antarctica. In Canada, these devel-
opments, in conjunction with what has been described as the
wartime northern “sovereignty crisis” (Grant, 1988:129),
prompted a renewed focus upon its position in the Arctic
(Bériault, 1942; Chaput, 1944). The DEA, viewing its rights
as “unchallenged but not unchallengeable” (Holmes, 1979:
172), acknowledged that “requirements of effective posses-
sion are now greater, and necessity of continuity of effective
possession is now emerging almost as a new requirement of
international law” (DEA, 1945).
Events during the post-1945 period further clarified the
situation in polar areas. Moves towards a more permanent
scientific presence in Antarctica proved influential, even if
legal uncertainties persisted, especially as the United States
refused to recognize the effectiveness of existing claims.
Canadian thinking was guided also by the views of interna-
tional lawyers, particularly those of the Foreign Office’s legal
advisers forwarded through the high commission in London
(Molson, 1948). There was also case law; thus, in 1954 the
Anglo-French Minquiers and Ecrehos case led the British
government to conclude that insufficient action had been
taken against Argentine-Chilean infringements of British
sovereignty over its Antarctic territories described as the
Falkland Islands Dependencies. In turn, other Common-
wealth states, including Canada, were advised about the legal
risks of acquiescence in any act liable to be regarded by a rival
as implying sovereignty over disputed polar territory (Com-
monwealth Relations Office, 1954). Within this context, it
became increasingly clear that the sector principle was being
pushed aside by the principle of effective occupation.
During both the late 1940s and early 1950s the British
government, searching for a way out of the impasse, proposed
referral of the Anglo-Argentine-Chilean dispute to the
International Court. The Canadian government, having been
consulted, stressed Britain’s freedom of action, even if, in
private, the DEA and Department of Northern Affairs proved
more sympathetic towards the British position. Support for a
peaceful settlement was accompanied by a desire for an
authoritative opinion by the International Court: “From the
purely Canadian point of view … our personal interest (lies)
in a judicial determination of the weight to be given to sector
claims in international law within the context of the now
accepted principle of effective occupation” (Parry, 1954). In
the event, Argentine and Chilean opposition foiled this hope.
In addition, Soviet legal publications, reflecting the post-
1945 escalation of the USSR’s activities in Antarctica,
attracted close scrutiny in Canada. Soviet commentators,
responding predictably to Cold War and ideological consid-
erations, criticized Antarctic claims advanced by “imperial-
ist” states in support of “aggressive” western interests (Afonin,
1948; Leontiev, 1950; Kostritsyn, 1951:43). During 1951
Kostritsyn’s “Regarding the Question of the Regime of the
Antarctic” was analyzed carefully in Canada (Canadian
Embassy, Moscow, 1951), given his emphasis on both the
“immense difference between the northern and southern
polar regions” and the continued validity of the sector princi-
ple in the former: “The theory of sectors in the Arctic can be
justified historically, economically, and strategically”
(Kostritsyn, 1951:38–39).
In the past, occasional difficulties about the Arctic had
arisen between Ottawa and Washington, as demonstrated by
Canadian irritation about the continuing refusal of United
States nationals to seek permission for entry to its northern
territories. As a result, Canadian policymakers kept a close
watch on the northern implications of the United States’s
position towards Antarctica: their concern was reinforced by
Washington’s refusal either to subscribe to the sector princi-
ple or to recognize existing claims. Certainly, the United
States government saw links between the two polar regions;
for instance, a 1952 position paper acknowledged that “any
solution of the [Antarctic] territorial problem should not
constitute a precedent adversely affecting US interests in the
Arctic” (U.S. Government, 1952). Reports about United
States’ activities at both poles fostered a sense of caution on
the part of Canadian policymakers:
There is the danger of an analogy being drawn in the
Arctic; the United States might be encouraged to believe
that just as it is being called into the Antarctic to ensure
positions for New Zealand, Australia and the United
Kingdom, which they cannot maintain alone, so in the
Canadian North where its participation in our defence
programme is extensive, it is sharing our legal rights …
We would prefer an arrangement that would cast no
shadow, however faint, on our exclusive sovereignty in
the Arctic (Léger, 1957).
Professor J. Tuzo Wilson, speaking to Canadian diplomats
in New Zealand upon his return from Antarctica, confessed to
being “both impressed and disturbed” by the magnitude of the
American effort therein during the International Geophysical
Year (IGY: 1957–58). Wilson, who was based at the Univer-
sity of Toronto, pointed to the “grave implications for Cana-
da’s sovereignty”:
Until recently, the Canadians could rightly claim to be the
experts on the Arctic and, on the basis of prior exploration
and discovery, could defend their territorial claims to the
Arctic islands … Now, however, the situation has changed.
Owing to the preponderant amount of information on
polar conditions which the Americans have acquired, the
United States government has earned the right, in Dr.
Wilson’s view, to contest the very premise upon which the
Canadian claims to sovereignty in the Arctic Archipelago
is based (Wilson, 1958).
Even allowing for his vested interest in enhancing the level
of northern research, Wilson’s report highlighted bipolar
interconnections alongside science’s role as the currency of
polar law and politics.
Throughout this period, there was little or no Canadian
interest in Antarctica per se. Canada’s prime concern arose
from an awareness of the ramifications for Canadian sover-
eignty in the Arctic, even if Antarctic developments were
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merely one of several external influences upon Canadian
thinking about the Arctic. Other influences included interna-
tional legal judgements (e.g., Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries
and the Minquiers and Ecrehos cases of 1951 and 1954) and
agreements (e.g., the Territorial Sea Convention, 1958)
(Killas, 1987; Pharand, 1988).
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTERESTS
For Canada, arctic research, though helping to satisfy the
activity criterion required for effective occupation, provided
knowledge and understanding. Also, it raised questions about
the merits of circumpolar and bipolar research strategies. For
example, how far could Antarctic research yield information
relevant to an understanding of the Arctic in general as well
as to scientific problems of specific importance to Canada in
such spheres as cartography, geology, gravitational studies,
magnetism, meteorology, and radio transmission? Was there
scope for technical and logistical cooperation in polar re-
gions? Was expertise transferable from one pole to the other,
as suggested by the United States’ use of the less politically
sensitive Antarctica for cold-weather training and equipment
“under Arctic conditions” (Beck, 1986:37)?
During the 1940s and 1950s, Canada undertook only a
marginal scientific Antarctic involvement. Few resources
were available for Antarctica. Limited funds and equipment,
in conjunction with the higher costs and politico-legal risks of
Antarctic expeditions, resulted in a concentration on the
Arctic. Nevertheless, Canadian scientists attended relevant
conferences (such as the Antarctic Meteorological Sympo-
sium, Buenos Aires, 1959), monitored Antarctic research,
and requested information about a wide range of projects, like
a French automatic weather station in Adélie Land (February
1957) and the Soviet use of rockets for meteorological pur-
poses (December 1957).
At the same time, there were repeated requests from
countries active in Antarctica (e.g., Argentina, Australia, and
Britain) seeking to utilize Canadian polar expertise, technol-
ogy, and equipment. For instance, a Canadian ice-boring
machine was used by the 1949–52 Norwegian-British-Swed-
ish expedition (Giaever, 1954), Canadian-built aircraft sup-
ported Australian and New Zealand scientists in the 1950s,
while during 1949–51 a Norseman plane piloted by Peter
Borden St. Louis, a Canadian, undertook a photographic
reconnaissance of part of the Falkland Island Dependencies
for the British government. Miles Clifford, the Falklands
Governor, visited Ottawa to make the arrangements, and
subsequently reported on St. Louis’ “good work” in the face
of “unpredictable weather and undependable charts” (Clifford,
1950). Thus, the St. Louis example, albeit overlooked by
Dean Beeby (1994), highlights the fact that Canadian partici-
pation in Antarctica occurred largely on an individual, often
unofficial, basis, even if it often resulted in distinguished,
even heroic and pioneering, contributions to Antarctic explo-
ration and research (Hattersley-Smith, 1986; Roots, 1987;
Beck, 1990; Beeby, 1994).
Career histories suggest an interesting two-way process:
Antarctic work, building upon pre-existing northern experi-
ence, provided information and expertise beneficial for the
Arctic. For example, Andrew Taylor (1907–93), the first
Canadian ever to lead an Antarctic expedition (Operation
Tabarin, 1944– 45), utilized this experience subsequently in
work on the Arctic weather station at Resolute, the siting
phase of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) line, and on the
Snow, Ice and Permafrost Sub-Committee of the Building
Research Council of Canada (Taylor, 1947; Beeby, 1994;
Davies, 1994). There is also the case of Fred Roots, who has
proved a major force in Canadian polar, circumpolar and
bipolar activities. Roots, a native of British Colombia, was
even refused permission by the Geological Survey of Canada
to join the 1949–52 Norwegian-British-Swedish expedition
as chief geologist because of its perceived “irrelevance” to
the Survey’s work (E.F. Roots, pers. comm. 1989; T. Lloyd,
pers. comm. 1989). As a result, he was forced to resign from
the Geological Survey (Beeby, 1994) and to seek another post
(eventually, he joined the Polar Continental Shelf Project) on
his return from an expedition in which his contribution was
commemorated by “Rootshorga” (Roots Knoll) in Queen
Maud Land.
Canada, the International Geophysical Year and the
Trans-Antarctic Expedition
Despite its worldwide character, the International Geo-
physical Year (IGY) of 1957–58 included a significant
Antarctic component. Norway, the United States, and the
Soviet Union were not only active at both poles but also
diverting scientific and other resources to the far south (T.
Lloyd, pers. comm. 1989). By contrast, Canadian participa-
tion in the IGY took place entirely on its own soil, as
rationalized by Dr. D.C. Rose, chairman of the Canadian
Committee for the IGY: “Since our own territories are so
extensive that they will take all our efforts, we are not sending
expeditions to other countries” (Rose, 1957).
In the event, repeated British requests for Canada’s views,
in conjunction with attendance at meetings of the Polar
Committee and the “old Commonwealth countries” in Lon-
don, familiarized Canada with IGY issues in general and
with proposals for a Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expe-
dition (TAE) led by Fuchs and Hillary in particular. Despite
anticipating a negative response, the British government
sought Canada’s views about participation in the TAE.
Unsurprisingly, interdepartmental exchanges displayed mini-
mal interest, indicating that the country’s interest in ice and
snow could be fully satisfied in the Arctic. A negative reply
was forwarded to London in September 1954 (Côté, 1954a),
although Côté had warned the British High Commission at
Ottawa already that, “even for Commonwealth solidarity …
we would not trudge the wastes of Antarctica” (Côté, 1954b).
Nevertheless, the TAE was able to use Canadian expertise
(e.g., the Spartan Air Company for aerial photography) and
equipment on the usual unofficial, commercial basis (Mon-
treal Star, 22 October 1955), even if, at one stage, a British
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request for RCAF support caused initial disquiet (DEA,
1955a).
Looking back, the IGY episode proved a significant long-
term influence in Antarctica. It established the value of polar
research conducted through international scientific coopera-
tion, while providing a strong basis for the secret negotiations
(1958 –59) responsible for the 1959 Antarctic Treaty; thus,
the initial twelve signatories were all active in Antarctica
during the IGY. Although it prompted no change of direction
in Canadian policy towards Antarctica, the IGY was not
entirely without influence; it highlighted the merits of both
polar research and bipolar links, as acknowledged by
Professor J. Tuzo Wilson, who had recently visited Antarctica:
“If there is one thing that the IGY has brought out it is that we
don’t know enough about the Polar regions” (Toronto
Telegram, 7 January 1959).
POLITICAL INTERESTS
Geographical, legal and strategic reasons help to explain
the Canadian preoccupation with the Arctic (Grant, 1988).
Even so, policymakers in Ottawa found it difficult to ignore
the global political ramifications of the Antarctic question;
thus, the Cold War context fostered an understandable desire
for peace, stability and harmonious relationships among
states active in Antarctica.
Nor was Canada allowed to ignore Antarctica. Despite
acknowledging the indirect nature of Canadian interests,
Australia, Britain, and New Zealand kept Ottawa informed of
developments, while sounding out the government’s views
on specific proposals. For Canadian high commissioners in
Canberra, Wellington, and, to a lesser extent, London, Ant-
arctica proved one of the more frequent topics for conversa-
tion with their respective host governments. Similarly, the
subject was often raised by ministerial visitors to Ottawa. For
example, during September 1955 Lester Pearson, the Cana-
dian Minister of External Affairs, received Richard Casey,
his Australian counterpart, who was en route to the United
States: “Somewhat to my surprise, Casey said that this
[Antarctica] was one of the most important subjects of discus-
sion which he proposed to bring up when he reached Wash-
ington” (DEA, 1955b). On a further visit in September 1959,
Casey commented again at length on Antarctica, alongside
other topics like the Colombo Plan, New Guinea, and West
Germany (DEA, 1959a). Antarctica was a regular topic for
pre-1939 Imperial Conferences (1921, 1926, 1930, 1937) and
post-1945 Commonwealth prime ministers’ conferences
(e.g., October 1948). Like other dominions, Canada was
represented on the British government’s Polar Committee,
which examined “questions of policy in the Antarctic, taking
into account also the bearing on these questions of policy in
the Arctic” (Dominions Office, 1945). The Polar Committee,
though receiving the Canadian Arctic Research Advisory
Committee’s annual reports on recent activities in the Cana-
dian Arctic, concentrated on Antarctic affairs. Few meetings
proved of real interest to Canada.
There was also the American dimension. The United States’
growing role in Antarctica, including its refusal to recognize
existing territorial claims, preoccupied Britain and other
Commonwealth states. However, at the same time, the Cold
War explained the aim shared by the United States, Common-
wealth and Latin American governments to exclude the Soviet
Union from Antarctica. This objective was treated sympa-
thetically in Canada, which supported efforts to limit the USSR’s
“political mischief-making” in Antarctica (DEA, 1958).
For most of the late 1940s and 1950s, Antarctica was
covered by the DEA’s Latin American desk; this reflected not
only its location below the tip of the American continent but
also the topic’s perceived significance for Canada’s relations
with Latin American states in general and with Argentina and
Chile in particular. The latter countries, attaching high prior-
ity to their respective overlapping Antarctic claims, chal-
lenged British sovereignty, thereby giving rise to an “Antarc-
tic Cold War” (Ottawa Citizen, 13 February 1954). The
Canadian government, though often offering implicit support
for the British position in private, assumed a neutral attitude
of avoiding public pronouncements regarding the merits of
any claim. Canada, advocating western unity at a time of
serious East-West tension, regretted the Anglo-Argentine-
Chilean dispute, including its apparent escalation during the
early 1950s. The most serious clash occurred in 1952, when
Argentine troops fired shots over the heads of British scien-
tists who were attempting to re-establish the base station at
Hope Bay (Beck, 1986). Canadian worries were accentuated
in 1953, when the government was forewarned of Britain’s
intention to remove Argentine and Chilean “intruders” from
Deception Island, Falkland Islands Dependencies (Pearson,
1953). Undeterred by Canadian warnings about adverse
impacts throughout Latin America, the British government
went ahead, as reported by the Ottawa Citizen (21 February
1953): “British toss Argentina off Island.” In the event, the
DEA, having requested urgent reports from its diplomatic
missions about reactions, was relieved to hear that the general
response in Latin America, even on the part of Argentina’s
government-controlled press, was relatively muted.
The United Nations’ prominent role in Canadian foreign
policy objectives resulted in the expression of hopes that any
internationalisation arrangements for Antarctica should take
full account of the UN dimension. By contrast, the Australian,
Argentinian, British, Chilean, South African, and United
States governments, fearing that this approach would open
the door to unwelcome Soviet interference, opposed any
substantial UN involvement in Antarctica. Cold War consid-
erations, alongside the USSR’s possession of a permanent
seat on the Security Council, coloured a South African
comment that attracted attention in Ottawa:
It may open up prospects of similar action in the north
polar regions and North Pole itself and raise issues of
far-reaching importance for the future security of the
west. Both north and south polar regions should be kept
out of the reach of the Security Council as at present
constituted (South African DEA, 1948).
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Within the DEA, Blanchette, reading a British note, wrote
“Arctic” in the margin alongside a passage arguing that “a
dangerous precedent might be created which would have
implications for other parts of the Empire which are inhabited
or sparsely inhabited” (Blanchette, 1948c).
Lester Pearson counselled caution:
The cases are not, of course, parallel, and any attempt to
treat them as such should be vigorously resisted … The
possibility, moreover, that any international organization
for the Antarctic might be exploited to our disadvantage
as regards the Arctic, makes it advisable for us to take no
active role in the settlement of the Antarctic dispute
(Pearson, 1948).
Nevertheless, Pearson departed from this brief in September
1955, when he horrified his Australian counterpart by ex-
pounding the benefits of UN intervention in Antarctica.
Casey, whose government faced growing Soviet activity
within the Australian Antarctic Territory, retorted by asking
how Canada would feel about similar action in the Arctic.
Pearson, who later admitted speaking “somewhat imprudently,”
replied that “we could not very well propose anything for one
end of the globe that we were not willing to accept for the
other, where our interests were involved” (Pearson, 1955).
In fact, the issue really came to the fore during 1956, and
to a lesser extent during 1958–59, when India attempted to
place “the question of Antarctica” on the UN’s agenda
(Statesman, India, 20 February 1956), much to the surprise
and consternation of the governments active in Antarctic
affairs. Once again, attendance at regular discussions held in
London and at UN headquarters in New York by the “old
Commonwealth” countries qualified Canadian efforts to re-
main on the sidelines. Within the DEA, contradictory thoughts
emerged on the subject. On the one hand, there were general
policy reasons to back the Indian proposal, such as those
relating to support for internationalising Antarctica through
the UN or to the fact that alignment with a leading Asian
power would make the UN look less a “western club.” On the
other hand, the proposal was resisted strongly by friendly
governments active in the region. International cooperation,
they argued, was already working effectively in the region,
thereby obviating any need for UN participation. Also, there
were the usual Arctic implications, which were now extended
to embrace self-determination.
Discussions in the United Nations might give rise to
incidental discussion of the Arctic. Because we should
presumably wish to safeguard Canadian sovereignty in the
Arctic Archipelago and would wish to discourage discuss-
ion of the status of Eskimos, it might be necessary to
emphasize that there is no geographical or political analogy
between the Arctic and the Antarctic (Cadieux, 1956).
From an early stage, other Commonwealth governments
acknowledged what one Australian diplomat described as the
DEA’s “cleavage of opinion” on the subject (Australian High
Commission, Ottawa, 1956). At one time, Australian diplo-
mats feared a serious disagreement with Canada on the matter
(Pyman, 1956), but in October 1956 the Canadian govern-
ment informed India of its view that UN intervention would
merely aggravate an already complex problem (Australian
High Commission, Delhi, 1956). In the event, the problem
went away. The Indian government, responding to strong lobby-
ing and reassurances about the continued “peaceful utility” of
Antarctica, withdrew the item, especially as more urgent
international problems (i.e., the Suez and Hungarian crises)
came to occupy centre stage.  Similarly, during 1958–59, when
India renewed the UN proposal, the initiative was overtaken
by the concluding stages of the Antarctic Treaty negotiations.
OTHER INTERESTS
During the 1940s and 1950s discussions by Canadian
policymakers about Antarctica were notable for their omis-
sion of any reference to economic factors. Although this
feature might be excused on the grounds of the “indirect”
nature of Canada’s interests, there was a clear failure to
acknowledge the actual economic and fiscal benefits arising
from the use made by other countries of Canadian expertise
and equipment in Antarctica, as outlined above. In fact, this
tendency continues today, at a time when “perhaps Canada
makes a greater financial return from activities performed in
Antarctica than any other country” (Beck, 1990:19).
Nor were environmental factors influential during the
decade or so after 1945. Conservation, which had yet to
become a major international concern, was mentioned only
briefly in the Antarctic Treaty (Article IX1f). Nevertheless,
DEA evaluations specifically noted, without elaborating, the
treaty’s focus on “the preservation of wild life and fisheries
resources” and “provision for the preservation and conserva-
tion of living resources in the Antarctic” (Hardy, 1959a).
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY:
NEGOTIATION, SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION
During the late 1950s the Canadian government, informed
by confidential documentation passed on by Commonwealth
governments as well as personal contacts (G. Rowley, pers.
comm. 1989), watched the Antarctic treaty negotiations
closely. There was, of course, no question of either participa-
tion in the talks or signature of the actual treaty. The Canadian
government merely sent a representative to attend the open-
ing public plenary session of the conference held at Washing-
ton in October 1959 to finalize the agreement.
Nevertheless, the negotiations prompted a detailed re-
evaluation of the government’s position towards Antarctica.
In many respects, the prime concern was to protect special
interests, as noted in June 1959 by Hardy:
Canada has certain negative interests in the matter.
Generally speaking, we do not wish broad principles to be
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enunciated which might be applied to both polar areas.
We do not, for example, wish any country to argue success-
fully that polar areas are properly international areas over
which no one country or group of countries should expect
to maintain effective legal sovereignty, or that polar areas,
because of their frigid characteristics, cannot be considered
as coming within accepted concepts of sovereignty. We
are interested in the definition of the continent and its
surrounding seas, the preservation of the wild life and
fisheries resources, the exchange of scientific ideas and
information, and the impact which the conference possibly
might have on Canada’s position at the forthcoming
conference on the law of the sea. We are also, I suppose,
desirous of staying out of an argument in which so many
of our friends and allies are involved. None of these
interests would appear to be threatened at the present time
(Hardy, 1959b).
Although this statement largely codified long-standing con-
cerns, there were newer preoccupations, such as those related
to the recently initiated law of the sea discussions.
In December 1959 the signature of the “historic … Polar
Peace Treaty” (Ottawa Citizen, 1 December 1959) rated front
page coverage in several Canadian newspapers, which fre-
quently quoted President Eisenhower’s interpretation of the
treaty as “a significant advance towards the goal of a peaceful
world” (Toronto Globe and Mail, 2 December 1959). Ac-
cording to DEA appraisals, the Antarctic Treaty’s useful and
noteworthy points included the protection of polar sover-
eignty claims; the participation of major powers; the ban on
nuclear explosions; provisions for demilitarization and in-
spection; the prospects for reduced friction in Antarctica; and
references to the United Nations (i.e., in the preamble, articles
III2, X, XIII1, 6) (DEA, 1959b). Canada’s global perspective
meant that interest was taken in the view, as articulated by one
New Zealand diplomat present at the Washington confer-
ence, that the treaty represented proof of the “melting” of the
Cold War (Hardy, 1959a). Indeed, the recent Eisenhower-
Khrushchev summit meeting held at Camp David (Septem-
ber 1959) encouraged the view that the treaty represented not
only the “Camp David spirit” in action but also “a notable step
towards international cooperation in the field of disarmament
and the control of nuclear energy” (Hardy, 1959a). Signifi-
cantly, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) took
note of the Antarctic Treaty at its Council session held on 9
December 1959. Against this background, the DEA monthly
bulletin’s coverage concentrated on the broader aspect: “The
tolerance and willingness to compromise displayed through-
out the negotiations has provided hope that similar progress
can be made in other areas of international discord” (DEA,
1960:515; Preston, 1965). Of course, for Canada, these “other
areas” excluded the Arctic. Perennial northern sensitivities,
reinforced by continuing press debates about “Whose Arctic
is it?” (Toronto Telegraph, 25 April 1959), explained why the
DEA’s monthly bulletin referred deliberately to “problems
peculiar to the Antarctic” in its article on the treaty talks
(DEA, 1959c:350).
In Ottawa, the Antarctic Treaty’s legal implications were
examined in more detail, with specific reference to the Arctic:
“From Canada’s point of view the treaty successfully avoids
any questioning of sovereignty in polar areas … [and] solves
a dispute in which many of our closest friends and allies were
involved” (Hardy, 1959a). In fact, it is more correct to state
that the Antarctic legal problem was shelved, not “solved,”
since article IV of the Antarctic Treaty merely involved an
agreement to disagree. The DEA noted with interest that the
treaty was defined to cover “islands,” “territory” as far as the
ice shelves, and the overlying air space, but specifically
excluded the high seas. Accession arrangements, it was felt,
reflected considerations related to the cold war (i.e., the
desire of western powers to exclude Communist China and
East Germany from Antarctic affairs) and the law of the sea
discussions (i.e., accession by any state invited by the United
Nations).
Subsequently, the Canadian government kept a watching
brief over developments. Certainly, there existed a desire to
remain reasonably well informed about Antarctic affairs and
meetings conducted by Antarctic Treaty parties. High com-
missions and embassies were instructed to pass on relevant
information, a process helped by the continued willingness of
Australia, Britain, New Zealand and the United States, among
others, to meet Canadian requests. Further news was fur-
nished on an occasional basis by Canadians working in
Antarctica, such as for Argentina, Chile and the United States
(e.g., Ottawa Journal, 18 October 1961; New York Times, 13
November 1961). Also, in 1960, the DEA, prompted by a
New Zealand suggestion, considered the merits of dispatch-
ing an official to ascertain “on the ground” the impact of the
Antarctic Treaty (High Commission, Wellington, 1960).
Eventually, the DEA authorised Edmonds, a diplomat based
at the high commission in Wellington, to undertake the visit,
but instructed him to be careful when discussing Canada’s
position towards both the Antarctic Treaty and polar sover-
eignty claims because “these may carry implications for
Canada’s Arctic claim” (DEA, 1961).
Edmonds’ trip south, reputed to be the first ever by a
Canadian diplomat, occurred between 3 –11 November 1961
with the help of travel arranged locally in New Zealand. The
tour was adjudged successful from both the representational
and informational points of view; thus, Edmonds met Admi-
ral Tyree (United States Antarctic Projects Officer), visited
the South Pole, and was interviewed at McMurdo base for
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation radio (High Commis-
sion, Wellington, 1961, 1962a). Upon his return, Edmonds
sent the DEA lengthy papers on international cooperation in
Antarctica and the US Antarctic programme. He reported the
“striking” degree of international cooperation in the region,
the US-USSR scientist exchange programme, and the respect
for non-militarization provisions highlighted by the blocked
gun emplacements on USN ships and the USN’s prohibition
of salutes and carrying arms within the Antarctic Treaty area
(High Commission, Wellington, 1962b). Edmonds reminded
the DEA that the country’s historic links with Antarctica were
recorded by “Canada Glacier” (located at 77˚37'S, 162˚50'E),
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which was “one of the most beautiful glaciers” in the Dry
Valley region (Edmonds, 1962). Edmonds also wrote an
article for the DEA bulletin (DEA, 1962a). Naturally, the
DEA ensured that his text, avoiding political and legal com-
plications, concentrated on less sensitive aspects, like J.T.
Wilson’s 1958 visit, the use of Canadian equipment in Ant-
arctica (e.g., Otter aircraft), bipolar research possibilities
(e.g., upper atmosphere), and the transfer of arctic expertise
(e.g., the value of USAF’s basic training on the DEW line)
(High Commission, Wellington, 1962c).
SHOULD CANADA ACCEDE TO THE
ANTARCTIC TREATY?
The Antarctic Treaty, signed in December 1959, was
ratified by all 12 signatories during 1960–61, and became
effective in June 1961. Poland acceded almost immediately.
These developments, in conjunction with the manner in
which other governments either welcomed Canadian acces-
sion as indicating approval of the fundamental principles
underlying the treaty (e.g., Australia, Britain) or exchanged
views on the subject (e.g., Denmark), reinforced occasional
interdepartmental exchanges on the subject. However, the
DEA, appreciating governmental unwillingness to become
actively involved in Antarctica, remained uncertain about the
rights and privileges accruing to acceding states, given the
two-tier membership system (Beck, 1986). Exchanges with
the British authorities in March 1962 failed to fully clarify the
position. Apart from Edmonds, there was little initial enthu-
siasm for accession, especially because of fears that acces-
sion implied acceptance of a similar arrangement for the
Arctic. In addition, only treaty parties active in Antarctica
(i.e., Consultative Parties) were represented at Antarctic
Treaty Consultative meetings, and hence doubts were ex-
pressed about Canadian acceptance of the second-class status
accorded to acceding states (G. Rowley, pers. comm. 1989).
Until the mid-1980s, the latter were not entitled to attend
these meetings, even as observers.
One interesting focus for discussion concerned the impact
of accession or non-accession upon Canada’s continued
access to Antarctic research data. The DEA submitted the
scientific question to the Advisory Committee on Northern
Development (ACND), an active body at this period and very
influential on policy (Sicotte, 1961; Rowley, 1992). On 18
December 1961 the ACND, guided by a report from its
Scientific Research subcommittee, concluded that the scien-
tific benefits of accession probably outweighed the disadvan-
tages (Rowley, 1992; Rowley, pers. comm. 1993). Rowley,
its Secretary, read out the conclusions over the phone to the
DEA, whose views were circulated to Canadian missions in
Canberra, London, Washington, and Wellington on 27 De-
cember 1961 (Robertson, 1961). For the DEA, political and
legal considerations held sway over scientific factors.
On balance, it would seem inadvisable at this stage, from
a purely political point of view, to accede to the treaty …
the possible political disadvantages might be offset by the
possible scientific benefits through our obtaining access
to the results of the research being done in the Antarctic
(Beesley, 1962).
The ACND’s identification of the “considerable assist-
ance” of Antarctic data to Canada’s Arctic research pro-
gramme led to further enquiries about the availability of
relevant research reports to non-signatories. In the event, the
resulting preparedness of Australia, Britain, New Zealand,
and the United States to supply Antarctic data, their willing-
ness to cooperate in bipolar research projects, and the ability
of Canadian scientists to work in Antarctica, qualified the
force of the ACND’s scientific rationale for accession.
On 25 August 1962 a meeting held at the DEA, having
considered the general pros and cons of accession, reaffirmed
somewhat predictably that the advantages of accession were
“not as strong” as often thought (DEA, 1962b). Significantly,
this meeting’s minutes, like those of the ACND meeting held
on this topic during the previous December and several Arctic
sovereignty files, remain closed in the archives. Also, as
noted by Rowley (1992), severe financial restraints restricted
not only the level of activity in the North but also the scope
for new initiatives towards the southern polar region, even if
Graham Rowley (1966) and Trevor Lloyd (1969–70), among
others, remained sympathetic to Canadian participation in
Antarctic research networks, like SCAR (Scientific Commit-
tee for Antarctic Research).
CONCLUSION:
TAKING A CANADIAN POSITION ON ANTARCTICA
In summer 1948 the Toronto Star (27 August 1948)
enquired how interested the Canadian government was in
Antarctica. No public response was offered, but the true
answer was not very interested. In practice, Antarctica, though
difficult to ignore because of its importance to Common-
wealth partners, the United States, Argentina and Chile, was
treated in Ottawa as “a very marginal topic” (Robertson, 1957).
Although the evolving nature of the Antarctic scene im-
parted a certain fluidity, the chief elements of policy were in
place by August 1948, when St. Laurent, the Minister of
External Affairs, decided that Canada should “take no active
part” in Antarctica matters (Wardroper, 1948). Henceforth,
the government consciously and consistently steered clear of
any meaningful involvement in Antarctica. The practical
consequences of this decision were illustrated in November
1948; thus, a British request for comment about a draft
Anglo-Argentine-Chilean naval agreement on Antarctica elic-
ited a response, agreed to by the minister, “that we have no
comment to make on the text of the draft declaration” (DEA,
1948). One decade later, when the Antarctic Treaty negotia-
tions concentrated Canadian minds again, the March 1958
DEA Summary Report confirmed the government’s “indirect
interest,” and largely replicated the points identified in 1948,
except that western anxieties about the emerging role of the
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USSR in the region were now taken into account (DEA,
1958). The key element of continuity concerned the percep-
tion of Antarctica through Arctic eyes, including the conse-
quent stress upon the distinctiveness of the two polar regions.
Canadian politicians and officials, albeit acknowledging their
polar character, reiterated constantly the fundamental geo-
graphical, political and legal separation of the Arctic and
Antarctica. In this vein, during April 1962 the DEA, noting
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, advised a member of parliament
on a response to a student query about the polar regions:
You might wish to point out … that the dissimilarities,
both political and physical, between the Arctic and the
Antarctic make it inappropriate to equate the two … Some
of the physical dissimilarities are that the Polar Basin of
the Arctic is mainly an ocean area, surrounded by conti-
nents, whereas Antarctica is a high ice-covered land
bounded by the sea … the Antarctic is the subject of an inter-
national treaty whereas the Arctic is not (Robertson, 1962).
The 1959 Antarctic Treaty transformed the south polar
scene, but not Canadian policy towards the area. In the event,
Canada, having been kept in closer touch with Antarctic
affairs since the 1930s than any other government outside the
ranks of the Antarctic Treaty’s initial twelve signatories,
adopted a rather distant attitude on the subject. The govern-
ment did not accede to the treaty until 4 May 1988, when Joe
Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, claimed that
“Canada, as a leading Arctic state and a major player in polar
science and technology, was taking its place among countries
with a strong interest in Antarctic matters” (DEA, 1988:1;
Beck, 1990). Significantly, Clark, building upon Canada’s
constant stress upon the region’s special character (UN-GAR,
1984; Beck, 1990), reaffirmed the “uniqueness of Antarc-
tica” (DEA, 1988:1). In July 1988 Canada acceded to the
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR), and subsequently took up associate
membership in SCAR (1993).
During the late 1980s, the Canadian government was
participating at last in Antarctic affairs, even if the two-tier
membership system meant that accession involved little more
than acceptance of the treaty’s principles and, an advance on
the early 1960s, observer status at consultative meetings. For
many, accession, though long anticipated, was overdue not
only because individual Canadian scientists and experts had
long been involved in the region but also because it came in
the wake of accession to the Antarctic Treaty by 25 other
governments since 1961. Even worse, Canada was the last
major arctic state to join the Antarctic Treaty System.
Rothwell (1994:72) has suggested that “workable solu-
tions to the legal and political issues confronting the Arctic
may be gained by critically assessing the ‘Antarctic experi-
ence’.” This article establishes that, at least during the period
between 1945 and 1962, Antarctic experience represented
one input to Canadian thinking and policy-making about the
Arctic, even if the Arctic provided the fundamental frame-
work within which south polar questions were always viewed
from Canada. This study offers also a meaningful back-
ground for the recent enhancement of Canada’s involvement
in Antarctic affairs, while performing a prominent role in the
cooperative arrangements for the Arctic centred upon the
International Arctic Science Committee. Recently, Graham
Rowley (pers. comm. 1993), looking back three decades to
the period when he was Secretary of the Advisory Committee
on Northern Development, commented: “At first I was sur-
prised that there is so little interest in the Antarctic, but
Canada has so much Arctic to be concerned with that the
Antarctic has to take a very far back seat.” For this reason,
arctic concerns will remain paramount for Canada.
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